Wednesday, October 15, 2014

What about POODLE?

Yesterday POODLE was announced, a fancy named new attack on the SSL 3.0 protocol, which relies on applications using a non-standard fallback mechanism, typically found in browsers. The attack takes advantage of
  • a vulnerability in the CBC mode in SSL 3.0 which is known since a decade
  • a non-standard fallback mechanism (often called as downgrade dance)
So the novel and crucial part of the attack is the exploitation of the non-standard fallback mechanism.What is that, you may ask. I'll try to explain it in the next paragraph. Note that in the next paragraphs I'll use the term SSL protocol to cover TLS as well, since TLS is simply a newer version of SSL.

The SSL protocol, has a protocol negotiation mechanism that wouldn't allow a fallback to SSL 3.0 from clients and servers that both support a newer variant (e.g, TLS 1.1). That detects modifications by man-in-the-middle attackers and the POODLE attack would have been thwarted. However, a limited set of clients, perform a custom protocol fallback, the downgrade dance, which is straightforward but insecure. That set of clients seem to be most of the browsers; those in order to negotiate an acceptable TLS version follow something along the lines:
  1. Connect using the highest SSL version (e.g., TLS 1.2)
  2. If that fails set the version to be TLS 1.1 and reconnect
  3. ...
  4. until there are no options and SSL 3.0 is used.
That's a non-standard way to negotiate TLS and as the POODLE attack demonstrates, it is insecure. Any attacker can interrupt the first connection and make it seem like failure to force a fallback to a weaker protocol. The good news is, that mostly browsers use this construct, and few other applications should be affected.

Why do browsers use this construct then? To their defence, there have been serious bugs in SSL and TLS standard protocol fallback implementation, in widespread software. For example, when TLS 1.2 was out, we realized that our TLS 1.2-enabled client in GnuTLS couldn't connect to a large part of the internet. Few large sites would refuse to talk to the GnuTLS client because it advertised TLS 1.2 as its highest supported protocol. The bug was on the server, that closed the connection when encountered with a newer protocol than its own, instead of negotiating its highest supported (in accordance with the TLS protocol). It took few years before TLS 1.2 was enabled by default in GnuTLS, and still then we had a hard time convincing our users that encountered connection failures, that it was a server bug. The truth is that users don't care who's bug it is, they will simply use software that just works.

There has been long time since then (TLS 1.2 was published in 2008), and today almost all public servers follow the TLS protocol negotiation. So that may be the time for browsers to get rid of that relic of the past. Unfortunately, that isn't the case. The IETF TLS working group is now trying to standardize counter-measures for the browser negotiation trickery. Even though I have become more pragmatist since 2008, I believe that forcing counter measures in every TLS implementation just because there used to (or may still be) be broken servers on the Internet, not only prolongs the life of an insecure out of protocol work-around, but creates a waste. That is, it creates a code dump called TLS protocol implementations which get filled with hacks and work-arounds, just because of few broken implementations. As Florian Weimer puts it, all applications pay a tax of extra code, potentially introducing new bugs, and even more scary potentially introducing more compatibility issues, just because some servers on the Internet have chosen not to follow the protocol.

Are there, however, any counter-measures that one can use to avoid the attack, without introducing an additional fallback signalling mechanism? As previously mentioned, if you are using the SSL protocol the recommended way, no work around is needed, you are safe. If for any reason you want to use the insecure non-standard protocol negotiation, make sure that no insecure protocols like SSL 3.0 are in the negotiated set or if disabling SSL 3.0 isn't an option, ensure that it is only allowed when negotiated as a fallback (e.g., offer TLS 1.0 + SSL 3.0, and only then accept SSL 3.0).

In any case, that attack has provided the incentive to remove SSL 3.0 from public servers on the Internet. Given that, and its known vulnerabilities, it will no longer be included by default in the upcoming GnuTLS 3.4.0.

[Last update 2014-10-20]

PS. There are some recommendations to work around the issue by using RC4 instead of a block cipher in SSL 3.0. That would defeat the current attack and it closes a door, by opening another; RC4 is a broken cipher and there are known attacks which recover plaintext for it.

3 comments:

  1. Can you tell me what you mean by no longer including SSL 3.0 by default? Does that mean you will remove it from the default priorities list or does that mean you are taking it out at compile time? For example, will I still be able to create a priorities list with +VERS-SSL3.0 in GnuTLS 3.4.0? Thanks

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    1. It will be removed from the default priority list.

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